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NOTES
SPECIFIC JURISDICTION: CAN THE
FOURTH CIRCUIT APPROACH SURVIVE
WOODSON?
In 1945, the United States Supreme Court sought to cure a
significant jurisdictional problem that had developed from the
increase in interstate travel and the burgeoning of interstate cor-
porations. State courts frequently were called upon to assert ju-
risdiction over nonresident defendants. While the Pennoyer doc-
trine1 allowed a state to assert jurisdiction over persons actually
present in the state, courts otherwise had little control over ab-
sent parties whose activities nonetheless affected the state.2 In
International Shoe Co. v. Washington,3 the United States Su-
preme Court attempted to remedy this problem by recognizing
that, under certain circumstances, asserting jurisdiction over an
absent corporate defendant "does not offend 'traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.' -4
Although lower courts, legal scholars, and the Supreme
Court itself have subjected International Shoe to considerable
scrutiny, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has advanced
some interesting approaches not adopted by the United States
1. The Supreme Court, in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), held that a state
had no power to confer jurisdiction over a defendant, absent his presence in the state.
2. The Supreme Court had advanced two other theories on which to base jurisdic-
tion over absent parties. First, a state had the authority to confer jurisdiction over its
domiciliary even though he was not actually present in the forum at the time of service
of process. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). Second, a state could assert juris-
diction over a defendant who consented. See Adams v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938)(de-
fendant consented to jurisdiction by initiating a suit in the forum even though he subse-
quently defaulted); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927)(consent to jurisdiction over a
nonresident driver was implied, based on the state's police power to regulate the use of
its highways); Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916) (a nonresident motorist consented
by filing an instrument required by the state appointing the Secretary of State to receive
service of process). Presence, domicile, and consent were inadequate, however, to meet
the changing times. See text accompanying notes 8-13 infra.
3. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
4. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
379
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Supreme Court. This Note will analyze the Fourth Circuit's res-
olution of jurisdictional questions in light of the standard estab-
lished by International Shoe and will contrast the court of ap-
peals' reasoning with a line of United States Supreme Court
decisions, 5  particularly World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson.6
I. THE BEGINNINGS OF SPECIFIC JURISDICTION
International Shoe Co. v. Washington "was a child of its
times."7 Suits prior to this decision primarily concerned individ-
uals; corporations then were small and locally owned., It became
apparent, however, that traditional bases of jurisdiction were in-
adequate to assert jurisdiction over foreign corporations.9 Con-
cepts such as physical presence and domicile were not applicable
to corporations, and fictional approaches based on consent or
implied consent,10 presence," and "doing business"1 2 were not
5. See Rush v. Savehuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84
(1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958);
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
6. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
7. Kalo, Jurisdiction as an Evolutionary Process: The Development of Quasi in
Rem or In Personam Principles, 1978 DuKE L.J. 1147, 1183.
8. Id. at 1182-83.
9. See notes 1 & 2 and accompanying text supra.
10. Some states enacted statutes giving the state personal jurisdiction over a corpo-
ration as a condition to its doing business within the state. Kalo, supra note 7, at 1166-
76; Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Personam Juris-
diction of State Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla A Review, 25 U. CH. L. Ray. 569,
578-79 (1958). Some corporations, pursuant to statute, appointed agents to receive ser-
vice of process; however, even absent such an appointment, the corporation might have
"consented" to jurisdiction by transacting business in the state. See Kalo, supra note 7,
at 1166-76; Kurland, supra, at 578-82.
11. As corporations began to do business outside of their state of incorporation, the
consent doctrine became an inadequate basis of jurisdiction, particularly absent a statute
requiring appointment of an agent. The presence doctrine came to be used when other
bases for jurisdiction, such as consent, were not appropriate. Kalo, supra note 7, at 1176-
80; Kurland, supra note 10, at 582-84.
12. The "doing business" theory was actually an extension of the consent and pres-
ence doctrines. The "doing business" approach attempted to measure the scope of a cor-
poration's activities in the state; if the activities were found to be substantial, the court
took jurisdiction based on "implied consent" or "presence." Kalo, supra note 7, at 1182.
Yet, as one commentator wrote regarding these doctrines: "[T]he time had long
since passed for the Supreme Court to acknowledge the truth of Holmes' dictum that
'[t]he Constitution is not to be satisfied with a fiction.'" Kurland, supra note 10, at 586
(quoting Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 390 (1937) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). Jus-
tice Marshall discussed these "fictions" in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 202-03
2
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satisfactory. Because the Depression had a resounding effect on
the business community and its relation to society, even litiga-
tional issues were influenced by a new social philosophy.13 Be-
cause of the nature of corporate activity, more lawsuits appeared
as corporations grew. Jurisdictional doctrine that once focused
on the parties began to require an examination of issues such as
judicial economy and the interest of the forum's residents in the
litigation. The factual situation in International Shoe provided
the perfect test for a new approach.14
In finding the state's assertion of jurisdiction proper in In-
ternational Shoe, the Court went beyond the traditional ques-
tion of whether the corporation was "doing business" in the
state. Rather, the Court concluded that the corporation had
enough contacts with the forum to make a suit "reasonable, in
the context of our federal system of government ... ."5 When
the corporation objected on due process grounds, the Court re-
sponded that due process requires only that a defendant "have
certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the main-
tenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.' "16 The Court relied heavily upon
the corporation's "systematic and continuous" activities in the
state and indicated that a corporation enjoying "the benefits
and protection of the laws of that state" must be subject to suit
in that state for "obligations" arising from defendant's activities
(1977).
13. During the Depression, individualism, spurred by the lost faith in business, de-
clined in general acceptance. Instead, individualism came to mean "the individual" with
an emphasis on the protection of persons from unrestrained corporate power. See Kalo,
supra note 7, at 1182-83.
14. The International Shoe Company sold shoes in Washington through the efforts
of local salesmen. These salesmen displayed the shoes, but did not authorize the sale of
any shoes within the state. A Washington statute required that a corporation that em-
ployed persons in the state make contributions to the state's unemployment compensa-
tion fund. The International Shoe Company contended that the local salesmen's activi-
ties did not constitute "doing business" in the state and, thus, the company was not
subject to the state court's jurisdiction to enforce the payments. The United States Su-
preme Court ruled that the state had jurisdiction. 326 U.S. at 321.
15. Id. at 317.
16. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
17. 326 U.S. at 320. The eleven to thirteen salesmen for the International Shoe
Company were all residents of Washington. These salesmen displayed samples of the
corporation's products and took orders from purchasers. These orders were sent to Inter-
national Shoe's St. Louis office. The salesmen made no collections, and the corporation
had no offices in the state. Id. at 313-14.
3
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there."'
International Shoe, thus, opened the door for suits that
once were not possible because of a state court's inability to ef-
fectuate jurisdiction. The Court's decision was a practical one;
since it was impossible to assert jurisdiction over an absent, non-
resident defendant under traditional notions, the Court had to
focus on the effect and character of that defendant's actions in
the forum. To establish the due process standard of "fair play
and substantial justice," the Court focused on two factors: (1)
whether defendant's activities established a substantial relation-
ship with the forum,"' and (2) whether the cause of action arose
from defendant's contacts with the forum.20 Yet, this decision
made clear that a mechanical test was not to be used to deter-
mine if the assertion of jurisdicion was proper.
[T]he criteria by which we mark the boundary line between
those activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to
suit, and those which do not, cannot be simply mechanical or
quantitative .... Whether due process is satisfied must de-
pend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in re-
lation to the fair and orderly administratibn of the laws which
it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.21
18. Id. at 319. The only "benefit and protection" specified was "the right to resort to
the courts for the enforcement of its rights." Id. at 320.
The jurisdiction asserted in International Shoe became known as specific jurisdic-
tion, a term credited to Arthur T. von Mehren and Donald T. Trautman, authors of one
of the most comprehensive articles concerning jurisdiction. See von Mehren & Traut-
man, Jurisdiction To Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1121 (1966).
Specific jurisdiction focused on the specific claim, or cause of action; the more traditional
basis for jurisdiction, general jurisdiction, focused on the relationship between the inter-
ested party and the forum: the forum's ability and right to draw the defendant into court
because of his presence in the forum, his consent to jurisdiction, his domicile in the state,
or the presence of his property in the forum. Id. at 1128, 1137; Woods, Pennoyer's De-
mise: Personal Jurisdiction After Shaffer and Kulko and a Modest Prediction Regard-
ing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 20 Amiz. L. REv. 861 (1978). See note 2
supra.
As one commentator explained: "[I]f a defendant is subject to general jurisdiction,
he may be called upon to defend in regard to any or all claims that a plaintiff may hold
against him." Woods, supra, at 863. In effect, the transaction or event that was the basis
of the suit was not at issue in deciding jurisdictional questions; rather, only the parties
and the forum were considered. Woods, supra, at 863. Increased interstate travel and the
growth of corporations made general jurisdiction less useful. See notes 9-12 and accom-
panying text supra.
19. 326 U.S. at 320.
20. Id.
21. Id, at 319 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 32
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II. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT APPROACH TO SPECIFIC JURISDICTION
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, following the dictates
of International Shoe, has considered a variety of factors in de-
termining whether jurisdiction in a particular case conforms
with due process standards. Unfortunately, the United States
Supreme Court has failed to examine several factors that, under
International Shoe, legitimately might affect a determination of
whether due process requirements have been met. This failure,
particularly in light of the Court's most recent major jurisdic-
tional decision,22 introduces uncertainty into the future of the
analytical approach taken by the Fourth Circuit.
A. Recognizing the General Standard of International Shoe
Ratliff v. Cooper Laboratories, Inc.23 concerned two prod-
ucts liability cases. In one, plaintiffs, residents of Florida, alleg-
edly purchased and used harmful drugs in Florida. They
brought suit in South Carolina against defendant, Cooper Labo-
ratories, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of busi-
ness in Connecticut. Cooper Laboratories' primary activity in
South Carolina was soliciting drug wholesalers and dealers by
mail and mailing promotional literature to approximately 650
physicians in the state. 4
In the other case, plaintiff, a resident of Indiana, purchased
and consumed in Indiana drugs manufactured by Sterling Drug,
Incorporated. Sterling, a Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business in New York,25 was authorized to do business
in South Carolina and had appointed an agent there for service
of process. Five "detail men" lived in South Carolina and pro-
moted defendant-Sterling's product through personal contacts
with physicians and drug stores throughout the state. Although
these men promoted the sale of the drugs, they did not sell
them." Plaintiffs in both cases filed suit in South Carolina to
take advantage of the six-year statute of limitations.27
22. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
23. 444 F.2d 745 (4th Cir. 1971).
24. Id. at 746.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. The statute of limitations had run in Delaware, Florida, Connecticut, New
York, and Indiana. Id.
19801 383
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The Fourth Circuit, citing International Shoe, ruled that
defendant's activities in South Carolina were not substantial
enough to meet the standards of "fairness" and "convenience."
The court noted that neither corporation had an office or ware-
house, real or personal property, or a bank account in the state.
Neither Sterling's appointment of an agent nor the mere solici-
tation by detail men was sufficient.28 Further, the court empha-
sized that the cause of action did not arise in the state or out of
defendant's contacts with the state:29 "If 'plaintiff's injury does
not arise out of something done in the forum state, then other
contacts between the corpration [sic] and the state must be
fairly extensive before the burdens of defending a suit there
may be imposed upon it. . ..
B. Importance of the Plaintiff's Residence
and Solicitation by the Defendant
In Lee v. Walworth Valve Co.,3 1 the court expounded on the
factors touched on in Ratliff. Here, a South Carolina resident
brought suit in South Carolina for the wrongful death of her
husband, who was killed in an explosion caused by a ruptured
steam valve on the U.S.S. Trenton while the ship was cruising
the high seas.3 2 The valve had been manufactured in Penn-
sylvania by defendant, Walworth Valve Company, and sent to
Seattle to be assembled on the Trenton.83
The court found that, although Walworth Valve Company
had no place of business, property, bank account, or salesmen in
South Carolina, it did conduct a substantial amount of business
in the state. Between 1969 and 1972, Walworth solicited busi-
ness in the state approximately eighty days a year and had sales
in South Carolina averaging $200,000 a year.3 ' Further, the court
pointed out that, although the cause of action did not arise in
28. Id. at 748.
29. Id.
30. Id. (quoting F. JAmEs, CWvM PROCEDURE 640 (1st ed. 1965))(emphasis added by
court).
31. 482 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1973).
32. The accident occurred off Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. At no time prior to the inci-
dent had the Trenton leen in South Carolina. Id. at 298.
33. Id. The other defendant, Lockheed Shipbuilding and Construction, consented to
suit in South Carolina. Id.
34. Id. at 298-99.
[Vol. 32384
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South Carolina or from contacts within the state, it did not oc-
cur in another state. According to the court, plaintiff had only
two possible forums, South Carolina and Pennsylvania, and be-
cause plaintiff was a citizen of South Carolina, South Carolina
had a substantial interest in the suit.3 5 The court distinguished
Ratliff by concluding that plaintiffs there were not residents of
South Carolina and the cause of action arose in another state.
The Fourth Circuit, while recognizing the due process con-
cerns of International Shoe,3 6 did not limit its analysis to the
two factors expressed therein-defendant's contacts with the fo-
rum and whether the cause of action arose from those contacts.
3 7
The court analyzed the first factor by explaining that the sub-
stantiality of defendant's contacts should "be determined by an
appraisal of the quality of the corporation's contacts with the
forum state and the fairness, under the circumstances, of hold-
ing it answerable there." 8 Rather than characterizing defen-
dant's contacts in terms of their continuity and regularity, the
approach in International Shoe,3 9 the Fourth Circuit empha-
sized the actual monetary benefits that defendant derived from
its contacts in the state. Although this distinction is consistent
with International Shoe's recognition that a defendant who en-
joys "the benefits" of a forum must be prepared to meet "obliga-
tions" that arise there,40 the Fourth Circuit's decision nonethe-
less suggests that a different standard exists if defendant has
solicited business in the forum. The circuit court's reasoning
suggests that jurisdiction may be asserted more readily against a
corporate defendant who actively solicits a market for its prod-
uct than against a noncorporate or noncommercial defendant.
Although jurisdiction over corporations conducting business
interstate was the context in which International Shoe was de-
cided,4 1 the United States Supreme Court has never indicated if
solicitation by a commercial defendant, as opposed to other
types of contacts by a noncommercial defendant, warrants a dif-
ferent analysis when determining whether substantial contacts
35. Id. at 299-300.
36. Id. at 299.
37. See text accompanying notes 19 & 20 supra.
38. 482 F.2d at 299 (emphasis added).
39. 326 U.S. at 320.
40. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
41. See notes 7-14 and accompanying text supra.
1980] 385
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exist.42 The court did discuss the solicitation activities of sales-
men in International Shoe, however, its decision was based on
the totality of defendant's activities within the state. The Court
noted that "solicitation . . . plus some additional activities...
are sufficient to render the corporation amenable to suit. .. .
In McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,44 the Su-
preme Court considered a case in which defendant's solicitation
in the forum was its only contact. In its analysis, however, the
Court did not address the significance of the fact that the nature
of the contact was solicitation. Instead, the Court chose to focus
on the effect of that contact on the forum.'5 Plaintiff sued the
International Life Insurance Company, a Texas corporation, in
the California courts to collect on a life insurance policy that
plaintiff's son had purchased.'8
The facts developed at trial were that the company's princi-
pal place of business was Texas, that it had no office or agent in
California, and that its only solicitation in the state was a single
request by mail for renewal of the policy.47 The Court, neverthe-
less, found that defendant's activities had a "substantial connec-
tion with that State.' 48 The contract had been delivered in Cali-
fornia, the premiums had been mailed from there, the insured
42. One commentator, citing the Supreme Court's decision in McGee v. Interna-
tional Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), says "a defendant who solicits or initiates inter-
state sales. . . must ordinarily litigate wherever his customers live." Louis, The Grasp of
Long Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds Its Reach: A Comment on World-Wide Volks-
wagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58 N.C.L. REv. 407, 429 (1980)(citations
omitted).
43. 326 U.S. at 314.
44. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
45. Arguably, if the Court had used the Fourth Circuit approach, it would not have
found defendant's contacts to be substantial. This lack of substantial contacts, however,
may not have been fatal to the California court's assertion of jurisdiction under the
Fourth Circuit approach, because plaintiff resided in the state and the state had an in-
terest in this type of litigation.
46. Plaintiff was the designated beneficiary. The company refused to pay, contend-
ing that the deceased had committed suicide, a bar to collection under the terms of the
policy, Id. at 221-22.
Deceased, a resident of California, had purchased the life insurance policy from an
Arizona corporation. The policy was later assumed by defendant, a Texas corporation.
International eventually sent a reinsurance certificate to the decedent in California; he
accepted the certificate and paid the premiums for two years before he died. When plain-
tiff sought to collect on the policy, the lower court ruled that it had no jurisdiction. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 223.
8
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was a resident of California at the time of his death, and wit-
nesses were located in California; taken together these factors
amounted to a "substantial connection" according to the
Court.49 Since the Court did not examine defendant's action in
terms of the benefit defendant received, this case provides little
guidance for evaluating the Fourth Circuit's approach in Lee. In
McGee, however, the Court recognized that a purely quantita-
tive analysis of defendant's contacts with the forum was not the
test advanced in International Shoe.
A year after McGee, the Supreme Court shed further light
on the role of solicitation in the minimum contacts analysis. Un-
like McGee, Hanson v. Denckla50 did not involve a commercial
enterprise. Rather, the controversy centered around the appoint-
ment of trust beneficiaries. 51 At issue was whether the Florida
courts could assert jurisdiction over a Delaware trustee52 when
the settlor had moved to Florida and exercised her power of ap-
49. Id.
50. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
51. At issue was the corpus of several trusts established by Dora Browning Donner.
Mrs. Donner, a domiciliary of Pennsylvania, executed a trust instrument in Delaware.
The trustee was the Wilmington Trust Company; securities comprised the corpus. Mrs.
Donner reserved the income for her life with the remainder to those whom she appointed
by inter vivos or testamentary instrument. Mrs. Donner subsequently moved to Florida
and executed an instrument that directed the sum of $200,000 to each of two trusts
previously created for the benefit of the children of Elizabeth Donner Hanson, her
daughter. The instrument was delivered to the Delaware Trust Company, the trustee of
both trusts. At the same time, Mrs. Donner executed her will. Mrs. Donner died in 1952.
Two of her daughters contended that the $400,000, which was to go to Mrs. Hanson's
children, had not effectively passed by the inter vivos instrument and should pass to
them by way of the residuary clause of her will. The daughters petitioned the Florida
chancery court for a declaratory judgment that this $400,000 was to pass to them. Per-
sonal service was made on various parties including Mrs. Hanson, her children, and the
Wilmington Trust Company and Delaware Trust Company as trustees. These defendants
contended that Florida had no jurisdiction. While the chancellor ruled that the court
lacked jurisdiction over nonappearing defendants, he did find jurisdiction based on the
appearance of Mrs. Hanson and her children and ruled that the disposition of the
$400,000 was testamentary in nature and invalid under the applicable Florida law.
During the pendency of this action, the executrix instituted an action in Delaware.
Although the residuary legatees claimed that the issue was res judicata because of the
Florida court action, the Delaware court ruled that the power of appointment and trust
were valid. A subsequent Florida Supreme Court decision affirmed the Chancellor's find-
ing that Florida law was controlling, but reversed the Chancellor by finding jurisdiction
over the absent defendants proper. Id. at 238-43.
52. Florida law indicated that a trustee was an indispensable party to the type of
proceeding in Hanson. The Supreme Court did not deal with that requirement in its
opinion. Id. at 254-55.
9
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pointment there. The Supreme Court ruled that the Florida
court had no jurisdiction over the trustee.
53
The Court emphasized that the trustee had no office and
transacted no business in Florida. The Court noted that the
trustee, unlike the defendant in McGee, had not solicited busi-
ness in the forum. The settlor's exercise of her power of appoint-
ment in Florida was not significant since the trust assets were in
Delaware. The only contact the trustee had with the forum was
the remittance of trust income into the state;54 this activity, ac-
cording to the Court, did not rise to the level of "purposeful
avail[ment]" necessary to meet the standard of International
Shoe.5
Arguably, the distinction made between Hanson and McGee
turned on the characterization of the McGee defendant's activi-
ties as commercial and on the nature of its contacts with the
forum. The acts of the trustee, according to the Court, did not
"bear the same relationship to the agreement as the solicitation
in McGee."15 6 Yet, the Court's failure to express the distinction
explicitly in terms of commercial solicitation leaves unclear the
viability of the approach suggested by the Fourth Circuit.
The Fourth Circuit's treatment of the second factor ad-
vanced in International Shoe-the relation of the cause of ac-
tion to the forum-represents a substantial deviation from the
Supreme Court's approach. In Lee, the Fourth Circuit, in effect,
substituted the state's interest in the suit arising from the plain-
tiff's residence for the relationship between the cause of action
and the forum. In Ratliff, when the cause of action also had
arisen outside the state, the court had found that jurisdiction
could not be exercised over defendant. The Lee court distin-
guished Ratliff as follows:
We held that the actions [in Ratliff] could not be maintained,
though the sale solicitation activity of the defendants there was
comparable to the in-state activity of Walworth here. Our
holding in Ratliff was dictated by the fact that South Carolina
had no interest in or connection with the controversy.-
5
53. Id.
54. Id. at 251-53.
55. Id. at 253.
56. Id. at 252.
57. Lee v. Walworth Valve Co., 482 F.2d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 1973).
[Vol. 32
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Thus, the Fourth Circuit in Lee made clear that even if the
cause of action does not arise in the forum, jurisdiction may be
properly asserted if the plaintiff resides there, so long as certain
other factors, such as extensive solicitation, are present.
C. Limiting the Scope of Lee v. Walworth Valve Co.
After Lee, it appeared the Fourth Circuit would provide a
forum for plaintiffs who established substantial contacts by the
defendant and a relationship between either the cause of action
and the forum or the plaintiff and the forum. A subsequent
Fourth Circuit decision, O'Neal v. Hicks Brokerage Co.,58 how-
ever, modified this unique standard. Plaintiffs, residents of
South Carolina, were injured in a collision in North Carolina be-
tween the truck in which they were riding and defendant's
truck. Plaintiff's truck was owned by a South Carolina corpora-
tion; defendant was a brokerage firm incorporated in Missis-
sippi, which arranged the transportation of cotton from Missis-
sippi to other states. Defendant's driver and truck were engaged
in that business at the time of the accident.59
The Fourth Circuit held that the South Carolina court had
no jurisdiction and remanded the suit,60 explaining that defen-
dant did not maintain an office in or advertise in South Caro-
lina. Defendant's only contacts with the state were arrangements
made by an agent for cotton to be shipped there. Deliveries had
been made under such arrangements approximately ninety
times; the total amount of commissions from these deliveries did
not exceed $10,000. 61
In distinguishing Lee, the court noted that, although as in
Lee the cause of action had not arisen in South Carolina, it did
arise in another state. In Lee, the cause of action arose at sea.
The residence of the Hicks plaintiffs in South Carolina was not
sufficient to counter the occurrence of the accident in North
Carolina. The court noted that "North Carolina law will apply
58. 537 F.2d 1266 (4th Cir. 1976).
59. Id. at 1267.
60. Id. at 1268. The court affirmed the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina's order granting the motion to quash service of process, but vacated
and remanded the case to afford appellants an opportunity to move to transfer the case
to a proper district. Id. This procedure is in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1976).
61. 537 F.2d at 1267.
1980]
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and witnesses concerning the happening of the accident are
available in North Carolina. 6 2 Balanced against defendant's "de
minimis"63 contacts with the forum, "the fairness required by
due process""4 did not give South Carolina jurisdiction in the
suit.
This type of analysis demonstrates the principle expressed
in International Shoe: the analysis requires an evaluation of
due process requirements in light of the "quality and nature of
the [defendant's] activity in relation to the fair and orderly ad-
ministration of the laws . "65 Although the Fourth Circuit's
method of measuring the degree of a defendant's solicitation in a
forum may suggest a quantitative approach, its express consider-
ation of the plaintiff's residence, the forum's interest in the liti-
gation, the place where the cause of action arose, and the nature
of the defendant's contacts demonstrates the court's recognition
of the International Shoe principles.
It is also this type of analysis that distinguishes Fourth Cir-
cuit decisions from those in the United States Supreme Court
since International Shoe. Although the Supreme Court has sug-
gested that it might consider numerous factors, it has never ex-
pressly done so. On two occasions, for example, the Supreme
Court has mentioned the plaintiff's relation to the forum. Yet, it
has never denominated this factor as critical, as has been the
case in Fourth Circuit decisions. In McGee, the Court did point
out that plaintiff was a forum resident, but it impliedly dimin-
ished the importance of this factor by choosing to characterize
defendant's contact with the forum as "substantial."
In Kulko v. Superior Court,6" the Court noted that the fo-
rum had an interest in a wife's claim for support because of her
and her children's residence in the forum; however, it did not
62. Id. at 1268.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 326 U.S. at 319.
66. 436 U.S. 84 (1978). In Kulko, appellee-wife sought to enforce her Haitian divorce
in California and to modify its custody and support provisions. Appellant-husband's only
contacts with California were a three-day stopover in 1959 and a subsequent twenty-four
hour stopover. Appellee asserted as a basis of jurisdiction the appellant's consent for the
children to go from New York to California. After the divorce, the wife had moved to
California; the children had remained with their father in New York. Appellant con-
sented to the daughter's move to California in 1973. The son joined his mother in 1975
without the father's consent. Id. at 87-88.
[Vol. 32390
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analyze that factor as a jurisdictional consideration. Rather the
court identified this factor in relation to conflict-of-law and visi-
tation considerations.6 7 The mention of this factor does suggest
that the Court may be influenced by the forum's particular in-
terest in the plaintiff's case. Because the Supreme Court did not
analyze this factor as being potentially significant, however, this
case provides little guidance concerning the viability of the
Fourth Circuit's approach.
D. The Fourth Circuit Approach After Woodson
The major difference between the approach of the Fourth
Circuit and that of the Supreme Court is the analytical signifi-
cance of the locus of the cause of action. In Lee and Hicks, the
Fourth Circuit demonstrated that the relationship of the cause
of action to the forum was one of several factors to be consid-
ered in determining jurisdiction. The United States Supreme
Court, particularly in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood-
son,"" has indicated that this factor merits almost no considera-
tion, at least until an independent, prior determination is made
that defendant had sufficient contacts with the forum. Although
the decisions in Shaffer v. Heitner e and Rush v. Savchuk70 sug-
67. Id. at 93, 98.
68. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). The parties at this stage of the suit were World-Wide
Volkswagen Corporation, Seaway Volkswagen, Incorporated, and Charles S. Woodson,
the District Judge of Creek County, Oklahoma.
69. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). In Shaffer, a nonresident shareholder brought suit in Dela-
ware against the former and present directors and officers of Greyhound for an alleged
breach of fiduciary duty. The breach arose from the corporation's activities in Oregon
and the payment of damages as a result of its antitrust activities there. Plaintiff also
filed a motion for sequestration of stock owned by defendants. The situs of the stock was
Delaware. Defendants contended that they did not have sufficient contacts with the fo-
rum to allow jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court held that the assertion of jurisdiction
was a violation of due process. Id. at 216-17.
Although the opinion primarily addresses quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, the Court did
point out that the cause of action had no real relation to defendants' contacts with the
forum, and those contacts alone were not enough to support jurisdiction. Id. at 213.
70. 444 U.S. 320 (1980). Rush reiterated the point made in Shaffer with regard to
the weight given to where the cause of action arose. Appellee in Rush sought to bring
suit in Minnesota against a nonresident defendant; the cause of action arose from an
automobile accident in Indiana. Appellee's basis for jurisdiction was quasi-in-rem in na-
ture; he garnished defendant's insurer's obligation to defend and indemnify Rush for her
injury. Id. at 322-25. The insured did business in Minnesota, but defendant had no con-
tacts with that state. Id. at 322. The decision, although reflecting the Court's attitude
concerning quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, is founded upon considerations advanced in Inter-
13
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gested the cause of action would be considered simultaneously
with defendant's contacts with the forum, Woodson demon-
strated that this was not the case. As one commentator ex-
plained, the approach used in Woodson "mandates a bifurcated
jurisdictional inquiry, beginning with a straightforward examina-
tion of defendant's contacts with the forum state.
7 1
Harry and Kay Robinson purchased an Audi from Seaway
Volkswagen, Incorporated (Seaway) in New York. During a
move to Arizona plaintiffs had an accident in Oklahoma.7 2 Plain-
tiffs brought suit"3 against the Audi representatives, alleging
that negligent workmanship caused the car to catch fire in the
accident. Mr. Robinson sued the retailer, Seaway; the manufac-
turer, Audi NSU Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft (Audi); the im-
porter, Volkswagen of America, Incorporated (Volkswagen); and
the regional distributor, World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation
(World-Wide). The Oklahoma court granted jurisdiction7 4 and
World-Wide and Seaway appealed. In a six to three decision, the
United States Supreme Court held that the Oklahoma court
could not exercise jurisdiction over defendants. 5
In its analysis, the Court identified two reasons for the test
promulgated in International Shoe: (1) it protects the defendant
from being forced to litigate in distant and inconvenient forums,
and (2) it insures that states do not overreach the limits of coe-
qual sovereignty in a federal system.78 The Court indicated that
the inconvenience factor generally has been measured by reason-
ableness and fairness, that is, "'"traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice." '"-7
The second concern, that of sovereignty, has been one of
national Shoe. That defendant's insurer did business in the state, according to the
Court, did not warrant a finding that defendant had any contacts with the forum. Id. at
328. Furthermore, the lower court's basis for finding jurisdiction-the insurance policy
itself-was not the subject matter of the suit and was not related to the cause of action.
Id. at 329.
71. Louis, supra note 42, at 422.
72. 444 U.S. at 288.
73. Mrs. Robinson sued on her own behalf. The father brought suit as the father
and next friend of the children. Id. at 288 n.2.
74. Id. at 289.
75. Id. at 291.
76. Id. at 291-92.
77. Id, at 292 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945)(quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))).
392 [Vol. 32
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importance since the inception of the minimum contacts doc-
trine, according to the Court. While McGee may be cited for the
premise that this concern was not important, the Court indi-
cated that this was never its view. Further, the Court rejected a
"stream of commerce" theory premised by plaintiffs.7 8
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented." Jus-
tice Brennan said the Court failed to emphasize the forum's
interest in this matter and argued that the "burden" on defen-
dants was not a substantial one, particularly in light of defen-
dants' commercial nature.80 To discount a "stream of commerce"
theory in this particular case, said Brennan, was not justified
given the character of defendants' businesses; that defendants'
product was intended to travel into other states justified suit in
Oklahoma and satisfied all notions of fairness.8 l
Justice Marshall argued that the key issue was the mobility
of the product itself. The car entered Oklahoma not by distribu-
tion, but by its intended purpose, under its own power. Kulko,
relied upon by the majority, should be distinguished, according
to Marshall, by the very point emphasized in that opinion: the
issue there was a personal and domestic one, while here it was a
commercial transaction in interstate business. 8 2 Justice Black-
mun summarized the general thrust of the dissents by saying
that there was no unfairness in requiring these defendants to
defend this suit in Oklahoma.
83
The decision in Woodson leaves a number of unanswered
questions. In its analysis, the Court indicated that defendants'
contacts vwere not sufficient, stating that neither of the defen-
dants "does any business in Oklahoma, ships or sells any prod-
ucts to or in that State, has an agent to receive process there, or
purchases advertisements in any media calculated to reach
Oklahoma. 81 4 The Court's only reference to the cause of action
78. Id. at 293. See note 96 infra.
79. Justices Marshall and Blackmun filed dissenting opinions in Woodson. Justice
Brennan filed a dissent that applied to this case, 444 U.S. at 299 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing), and to Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 333 (1980)(Brennan, J., dissenting), decided
at the same time.
80. 444 U.S. at 303 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 306-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 316 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 317 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 289.
1980]
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was to characterize it as "one, isolated occurrence .... ,,85 The
case thus suggests that a defendant has to have substantial con-
tacts with the forum before the cause of action is even
considered."'
This reasoning illustrates a position that the Court had not
before advanced. Previously, it had not been considered that the
cause of action itself could not be a substantial contact. In fact,
in Shaffer and Rush, the Court suggested that a stronger show-
ing of the relation of the cause of action to the forum might have
altered those decisions. Since the cause of action in Woodson,
unlike those in the previous Supreme Court decisions, was based
on personal injury allegedly caused by a defect in defendants'
product, one could argue that this contact in itself was suffi-
ciently substantial to allow the forum to exercise jurisdiction.s8
Significantly, the Fourth Circuit's approach in this area is in
direct conflict with Woodson. Although Lee is the only case dis-
cussed that actually allowed jurisdiction, the Fourth Circuit's
analysis in that case and in Hicks indicates that the cause of
action, balanced with factors such as plaintiff's relation to the
forum and the nature and extent of defendant's contacts in the
forum, is of crucial importance. In contrast, the Supreme Court,
by its refusal to consider the cause of action as important as de-
fendant's contacts with the forum in Woodson, discounts the re-
lation of the cause of action to the forum in a case in which it
should be a major concern.
Woodson further demonstrates that this Court has lost sight
85. Id. at 295.
86. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
87. See notes 69 & 70 and accompanying text supra.
88. While the cause of action was not characterized by the Court in terms of tort or
contract, it is a crucial distinction that the cause of action was based on tort rather than
contract. Unlike contract, in which the place of inception, agreement, and performance
may suggest three different forums, the place of injury introduces only one.
The Woodson Court, to explain that the occurrence of the accident in the forum was
only "one, isolated occurrence" and that the view of such an event as "foreseeable" was
unreasonable, cited a 1956 Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals case, Erlanger Mills, Inc. v.
Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956). In Erlanger, the court refused to
find jurisdiction based on a defendant's single shipment of yam to a North Carolina
corporation. Although the court said that the result did not turn on the characterization
of the suit as one for breach of contract rather than for tort, id. at 507-08, it did point
out that the agreement "was consummated in New York," executed in New York, and
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of the principle, stated in International Shoe and relied upon by
the Fourth Circuit, that defendant's activities must be con-
sidered in light of "the fair and orderly administration of the
laws which it is the purpose of the due process clause to in-
sure." Although the Woodson Court suggested that it always
considered "other relevant factors,"' 0 such a consideration was
not evident in the opinion. This approach is a departure from
that suggested in Kulko, Shaffer, and Rush. In those cases, the
Court appeared concerned with the events surrounding the
cause of action,9 1 but it did not say that these alone might jus-
tify a finding of jurisdiction. Yet, a reasonable conclusion would
have been that the Court's specific mention of where the cause
of action arose in each of the cases evidenced a real concern, and
thus, given the proper fact pattern, it might find substantial
contacts based solely on the facts related to the cause of action.
After Woodson, that is obviously not the case. Such a result
seems inequitable when the cause of action is based on personal
injuries sustained by plaintiffs in the forum.
This decision by the Supreme Court demonstrates that the
present court has moved away from the very foundation of In-
ternational Shoe and specific jurisdiction.' 2 International Shoe
was decided at a time when jurisdiction over foreign corporate
defendants was difficult to achieve."9 The problem had become
acute as corporations began to benefit from extensive interstate
activity and, at the same time, could not be held accountable for
claims arising from that activity." With International Shoe, the
Court appeared to counter this advantage of a corporate defen-
dant by forcing the corporation to answer to any obligations in
89. 326 U.s. at 319.
90. 444 U.S. at 292.
91. See text accompanying notes 66, 69 & 70 supra.
92. One commentator, approving the decision in Woodson, said the Court was
"turn[ing] the clock back to an earlier time when jurisdiction, like substantive tort law,
was concerned more with defendant's conduct and less with notions of social welfare and
convenient risk allocation." Louis, supra note 42, at 428. The philosophy that the Court
must focus solely on the due process rights of defendant, rather than on a fairness test
balancing the interests of all parties, apparently rests upon the assumption that "plain-
tiffs as a group are no longer as helpless as they perhaps once were ..... Id. at 429.
The obvious reply is that it is the use of a balancing or fairness test by courts such as the
Fourth Circuit since International Shoe that has made plaintiffs less helpless, if indeed
they are.
93. See notes 9-12 and accompanying text supra.
94. See notes 9-13 and accompanying text supra.
1980]
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the forumY5 The Court recognized this principle, if not always
expressly, in its subsequent decisions. In Kulko, for instance, the
Court discussed defendant's contacts with the forum in the con-
text of defendant's noncommercial character. The Court made
clear that the nature of the defendant shed a new light on the
minimum contacts analysis. As the Court explained:
The cause of action herein asserted arises, not from the
defendant's commercial transactions in interstate commerce,
but rather from his personal, domestic relations. It thus cannot
be said that appellant has sought a commercial benefit from
solicitation of business from a resident of California that could
reasonably render him liable to suit in state court; appellant's
activities cannot fairly be analogized to an insurer's sending an
insurance contract and premium notices into the state to an
insured resident of the State.96
95. Kalo, supra note 7, at 1182-83.
96. 436 U.S. at 97. The thrust of this analysis is that a defendant who enters a
forum with a commercial intent should be held to a higher standard of duty in the fo-
rum. One commentator has suggested that the standard to determine whether a defen-
dant should be so characterized is "the relative aggressiveness of the parties." Woods,
supra note 18, at 891-92. For instance, a national corporation that seeks out a national
market should not be allowed to avoid suit while taking advantage of the consumer by
asserting a "lack of jurisdiction" defense. By comparison, a physician, treating an out-of-
state visitor who later seeks to sue the physician in the patient's home state, should not
be subject to suit without any other contacts with the forum. Wright v. Yarkley, 459 F.2d
287 (4th Cir. 1972), cited in Woods, supra note 18, at 892. Defendants in Woodson may
fall somewhere between these examples; yet as Justice Blackmun contended in his dis-
sent of that case: "All [the dealer, the manufacturer, and the importer] are in the busi-
ness of providing vehicles ... [and] [i]t is not too much to anticipate at the time of
distribution and at the time of retail sale that this Audi would be in Oklahoma." 444
U.S. at 318 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
This type of analysis is not unique. In Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sani-
tary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), the Illinois court spoke of defendant's
activities and the unjustness that would result if the corporate defendant were not sub-
ject to suit after receiving the benefits of selling its products in the state and the protec-
tion of the state's laws. This theory has often been characterized as a "stream of com-
merce" analysis: a commercial defendant that enters goods into the flow of commerce
should be aware that suits may arise in other forums.
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), characterized this
type of activity as "continuous and systematic [in] nature." Yet, even there the Supreme
Court refused to base its decision on defendant's commercial character. Perhaps the
most frequent characterization of this factor is the foreseeability approach presented in
Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 843, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113
(1969). The California Supreme Court allowed jurisdiction, indicating that "if the manu-
facturer sells its products in circumstances such that it knows or should reasonably an-
ticipate that they will ultimately be resold in a particular state, it should be held to have
purposely availed itself of the market. . ." Id. at 902, 458 P.2d at 64, 80 Cal. Rptr. at
18
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The Woodson Court, however, ignored the crucial difference in
the nature of the parties to that suit.
III. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has set forth a broader
analysis than yet has been offered by the United States Supreme
Court. By indicating that a variety of factors must be considered
in determining the proper exercise of jurisdiction, the Fourth
Circuit has followed the important principles of International
Shoe. Yet, after Woodson, such an approach seems doubtful if
not incorrect.
Required now is merely an evaluation of defendant's con-
tacts with the proposed forum in terms of the amount of sales,
the number of offices, the presence of an agent, and the degree
of advertisement. 97 Thus, the test for jurisdiction now appears to
be the mechanically applied, quantitative approach expressly
disclaimed in International Shoe.9 8
Beverly A. Carroll
120.
The Supreme Court rejected the foreseeability standard in Woodson, stating that
"the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum state.. ." is not a
crucial concern in terms of due process. 444 U.S. at 297. Instead, the Court said the
concern should focus on defendant's conduct and whether "he could reasonably antici-
pate being haled into court there." Id.
97. 444 U.S. at 295.
98. See Louis, supra note 42, at 430-31.
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